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PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION:
SHOULD CONNICK V. MYERS' SPEECH-BASED
PUBLIC-CONCERN RULE APPLY?
MARK STRAUSS
INTRODUCTION
No more than twenty-four hours after defeating her supervisor in a
grievance dispute, Alice Griffin, then an assistant principal in a Chicago
public school, was suddenly stripped of her administrative duties and re-
assigned to a classroom.' Griffin was sure the reassignment had been
ordered by her supervisor in retaliation for his defeat at the grievance
hearing.2 Instead of filing a second grievance, Griffin decided to sue the
supervisor over the reassignment in federal court. To do so, she would
have to parlay the wrongdoing that she believed she had suffered into a
federal cause of action.
By 1986, the year of Griffin's reassignment,3 the Supreme Court had
long recognized that a public employee could not be fired or otherwise
retaliated against for exercising his or her First Amendment freedom of
speech.4 At the same time, the Court also recognized the countervailing
principle that the government, in its role as an employer, had a legitimate
interest in controlling the speech of its employees in order to maintain
workplace discipline, harmony, and productivity-goals incompatible
with unfettered worker expression.5 The Court unified these principles in
Pickering v. Board of Education,6 where it established that the free speech
claims of public employees were to be evaluated by balancing the
worker's expressive rights against the employer's reasons for the retalia-
tory personnel decision-that is, in light of the employer's legitimate in-
terest in workplace efficiency.7 Pickering seemed to provide Griffin the
1. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1991).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142 (1983); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S.
593, 597 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968); Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967).
These cases marked a departure from the long-unchallenged doctrine that public em-
ployees had no right to object to the terms of employment-even if those terms deprived
them of constitutional rights. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 143-44. This doctrine was
summed up in an observation by Justice Holmes, then sitting on the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts, that "[t]he petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk
politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman." MeAuliffe v. Mayor of
New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass. 1892).
5. See Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-70.
6. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
7. See id. at 568. In Pickering, the Court held that a school board could not fire a
teacher for writing a letter to a local newspaper criticizing the board's tax policies. See
id. at 569-70.
By 1986, numerous public employees who allegedly had suffered retaliatory personnel
treatment in response to expressive activities had sought relief under Pickering-many
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requisite legal theory on which to proceed in federal court.
Griffin no doubt was alert, however, to the Supreme Court's 1983 deci-
sion in Connick v. Myers.' By that time, as one commentator observed,
the Court regarded Pickering as "exploited and debased" by litigious
public employees flooding the courts with "glorified workplace gripes."9
Connick sharply curtailed the ability of plaintiffs to prevail in Pickering
claims. It did so by imposing on public employees a new threshold re-
quirement for gaining access to federal court: in order to state a cause of
action, the speech allegedly trammeled must have addressed "matters of
public concern." 10 Only if a plaintiff's speech met this threshold could a
court proceed to the balancing test set forth in Pickering." I If a particu-
lar employee's speech dealt with matters "of only personal interest.., a
federal court [was] not the appropriate forum" for vindication of that
employee's rights. 2
Griffin's original grievance consisted of a complaint about an evalua-
successfully. Compare Phillips v. Adult Probation Dep't, 491 F.2d 951, 955 (9th Cir.
1974) (holding that First Amendment did not provide probation officer with right to
display poster portraying fugitives from law in favorable light, since it would "impair the
efficiency of the Department through dissension and disharmony") with Tygrett v. Barry,
627 F.2d 1279, 1281, 1287 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (holding that police officer may not be dis-
charged for advocating "sick-in" or for lobbying Congress for passage of bill increasing
pay of police personnel).
8. 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
9. Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of an
Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1990).
10. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147.
11. See id. at 146-47. Presumably, an employee barred from a civil rights claim by
Connick could pursue his or her legitimate personnel complaints either in state court or
before a grievance board provided by a collective bargaining agreement. Although the
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1988), pertains only to private em-
ployers, see 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), state and federal public employment relations acts pro-
vide certain classes of public employees with the rights to collective bargaining and fair
labor practices. See, eg., Civil Service Reform Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7106, 7111-7135
(1988) (federal public employment relations act); Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 447.201-.609 (West
1981 & Supp. 1992) (comprehensive state public employment relations act covering all
public employees).
12. Connick, 461 U.S. at 147. The Connick Court characterized matters of public
concern as those "fairly considered as relating to any matter of political, social, or other
concern to the community." Id. at 146.
Connick involved an assistant district attorney who was fired after first objecting to a
proposed job transfer and then circulating a questionnaire concerning office transfer pol-
icy, office morale, the need for a grievance committee, the level of confidence in supervi-
sors, and whether employees felt pressured to work in political campaigns. See id. at 140-
42. The Court found that, except for the question regarding pressure to work on political
campaigns, the items in the questionnaire involved matters of only personal concern. See
id. at 148. The Court reasoned that the questionnaire's purpose was "not to evaluate the
performance of the office but rather to gather ammunition for another round of contro-
versy with her superiors," and that the questionnaire merely "reflect[ed] one employee's
dissatisfaction with a transfer and an attempt to turn that displeasure into a cause
c,6lbre." Id. Although the Court found the political-campaign question to be of public
concern, it concluded that the discharge was nevertheless justified by the government's
interest in ensuring a disciplined and well-functioning workplace. See id. at 149-54.
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tion of her job performance. 13 As such, the grievance plainly constituted
speech of only personal concern.' 4 Connick thus foreclosed a lawsuit for
infringement of Griffin's freedom of speech. Accordingly, Griffin ad-
vanced another claim: that the reassignment, imposed in retaliation for a
grievance brought through her union, deprived her of her First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to freedom of association-a claim to
which Connick's public-concern rule assertedly did not apply."5
Griffin's claim thus raised a question that has caused disagreement
among the courts: should Connick's free-speech-based public-concern
rule apply to claims based on the right to freedom of association?
Some courts have held or assumed without discussion that the rule
should apply, with the public-concern inquiry focusing on the expression
sought to be advanced by the plaintiff through his associational member-
ship. 6 This view denies causes of action to plaintiffs such as Griffin.
Courts so holding justify their conclusions with two main arguments:
first, that Connick relied on a series of cases addressing both expressive
and associational rights;' 7 and second, that to hold otherwise would pro-
tect association more than speech, whereas the Supreme Court has been
disinclined to create a hierarchy of First Amendment labels.'"
Other courts have held or assumed without discussion that the Con-
nick rule should not apply.'9 This view allows plaintiffs like Griffin to
assert freedom-of-association claims independent of any freedom-of-
speech claim. Courts so holding also justify their conclusions with two
main arguments: first, that the right of association has long been held to
embrace broad areas of association plainly not of public concern; and
second, that when a public employee files a union grievance (a recurring
fact-pattern in such cases), the employee is exercising his constitutional
right to petition for redress of grievances, and associational activity for
such First Amendment ends is generally protected.
In April 1991, the Seventh Circuit sided with the first group of courts
and applied the public-concern requirement in Griffin v. Thomas, thus
upholding summary judgment for the school district.2' Yet disagreement
13. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1211 (7th Cir. 1991).
14. See id. at 1214-15.
15. See id. at 1211.
16. See Monks v. Marlinga, 923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 1991); Boals v. Gray, 775
F.2d 686, 691-93 (6th Cir. 1985); Broderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D. Mass.
1991); Petrozza v. Incorporated Village of Freeport, 602 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D.N.Y.
1984).
17. See infra notes 108-114 and accompanying text.
18. See infra note 115 and accompanying text.
19. See Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1556-57 (11th
Cir. 1987); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. Re-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 866-67 & n.1 (10th
Cir. 1986); Stelmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1989); Gavrilles
v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 n.* (D. Mass. 1984); Parker v. Cronvich, 567 F.
Supp. 1073, 1076 nn.6-7 (E.D. La. 1983).
20. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
21. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213-15 (7th Cir. 1991).
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on this question remains.
This Note attempts to settle this division in authority. It argues that
the reasoning on both sides of this dispute has, by and large, fallen wide
of the mark. Part I explains how the Supreme Court has delineated two
categories of constitutionally protected association: expressive associa-
tion and intimate association. Part II submits that these doctrines com-
pel certain straightforward answers: first, that Connick's public-concern
rule must be applied to claims based on the right of expressive associa-
tion, because this right derives from freedom of speech; and second, that
Connick's public-concern rule must not be applied to claims based on the
right of intimate association, because this constitutionally recognized
right, by definition, protects associations of highly personal interest. Part
II also considers how the lower courts have deviated from these princi-
ples. Part III explores the theoretical debate over the function of the
First Amendment that lurks behind the question of Connick's applicabil-
ity to associational claims. It explains how this question creates a con-
frontation between two competing theories of the First Amendment-
namely, the Meildejohn theory (that the First Amendment should shelter
only public-issue speech) and the liberty theory (that the First Amend-
ment should protect virtually all expression relevant to individual self-
realization). Part III also explains the seeming hostility or inattentive-
ness of the courts to the pertinent Supreme Court doctrines as a function
of this theoretical dispute. Finally, this Note concludes that, whatever
theoretical objections the courts may have to Connick and to the theory
of the First Amendment underlying that decision, and however sound
these objections may be, Supreme Court doctrine nevertheless mandates
the application of Connick's public-concern rule to the First Amendment
association claims of public employees.
I. SUPREME COURT DOCTRINE
Although the right to freedom of association is not expressly set out in
the Constitution, the Supreme Court has long recognized such a right,
albeit a limited one.22 In particular, the Court has delineated two catego-
ries of protected association: "expressive association," and "intimate as-
sociation."23 Expressive association is the right to join with others for
the purpose of engaging in activities protected by the First Amend-
ment.24 Intimate association is the right to maintain highly personal re-
lationships free from unjustified government interference.25 At times,
particularly in the 1950s and early 1960s, the Court seemed to entertain a
more expansive notion of the right of association, and to suggest that this
22. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 617-23 (1984).
23. Id. at 618-23; see also infra text accompanying notes 30-80 (discussing rights to
expressive and intimate association).
24. See infra notes 30-62 and accompanying text (discussing freedom of expressive
association).
25. See infra notes 63-80 and accompanying text.
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right encompassed groups organized for a wide range of purposes and
that it stood independently and on an equal footing with other funda-
mental rights.26  Yet, particularly since Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,27 the Court has displayed a dedication to these two formalized
categories (expressive association and intimate association) as the gov-
erning doctrines for evaluating associational claims.28 The Court has set-
tled into a pattern of testing associational claims against these doctrines
to ascertain whether grounds for protection exist. 29
A. Freedom of Expressive Association-A First Amendment Doctrine
Expressive association is the right to associate for the purpose of
engaging in activities independently protected by the First Amend-
26. See Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law, § 12-26, at 1012-13 (2d ed.
1988) (citing Citizens Against Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981)); Thomas L
Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 Yale L.J. 1, 13-15
(1964); Reena Raggi, An Independent Right to Freedom of Association, 12 Harv. C.R.-
C.L. L. Rev. 1, 3-4, 7-8, (1977) (citing USDA v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 541 (1973)
(Douglas, J., concurring); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,486 (1965); NAACP v.
Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958)); Aviam Soifer, 'Toward a Genera-
lized Notion of the Right to Form or Join an Association'" An Essay for Tom Emerson, 38
Case W. Res. L. Rev. 641, 646 & n.13 (1988) (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Inves-
tigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 568-69 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); Louisiana ex reL
Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 296 (1961)); James W. Torke, What Price Belong-
ing: An Essay on Groups, Community, and the Constitution, 24 Ind. L Rev. 1, 58-59
(1990) (citing Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 562, 565,
569 n.7 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S.
449, 460-61 (1958)).
27. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
28. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 23-26 (1989); New York State Club
Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1988); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l
v. Rotary Club, 481 U.S. 537, 544-49 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 617-18 (1984); John E. Nowak & Ronald D. Rotunda, Constitutional Law § 16.41,
at 1063 (4th ed. 1991); Raggi, supra note 26, at 9-11; Soifer, supra note 26, at 653; The
Supreme Court 1983 Term-Leading Cases, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 87, 203 (1984) [hereinafter
Leading Cases]; Torke, supra note 26, at 48-49.
The Court has recognized a third, subordinate type of freedom of association-the
freedom to associate in labor unions and trade associations. See Nowak & Rotunda,
supra, § 16.41, at 1063. This lesser right is protected as an aspect of liberty under the due
process clause. Unlike expressive and intimate association, however, this right is not
deemed fundamental, see id., and the Court has been disinclined to invalidate rationally-
related legislation restricting it. See, eg., Railway Mail Ass'n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93-94
(1945) (upholding statute prohibiting racially discriminatory labor union membership
practices); see also supra note 11 (discussing rights of workers in labor unions).
29. See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 23-26; New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 11-13;
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 544-49; Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-19.
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ment-assembly,3 ° petition for redress of grievances,31 worship,32 and
speech.33 Thus, expressive association, as expounded by the Supreme
Court, is not a free-standing or independent right, but rather a "correla-
tive" or "ancillary" one.34 Expressive association exists solely as an in-
strument for or a means of preserving and enhancing the primary First
Amendment liberties of assembly, worship, petition, and speech. 35 The
rationale offered for this "instrumental" 36 freedom of association is that
these primary First Amendment liberties "could not be vigorously pro-
tected from interference by the State unless a correlative freedom to en-
gage in group effort toward those ends were not also guaranteed." 37
As for the right's function regarding speech in particular, the right of
expressive association guarantees that "by collective effort individuals
can make their views known, when individually, their voices would be
faint or lost."3 Although the cases involve groups, 39 the Court's rheto-
ric is cast in terms of the rights of individuals, which have to be safe-
30. The right of association should be distinguished from the related right of assem-
bly. The right of assembly is the right physically to hold and attend meetings, marches,
pickets, demonstrations, parades, and the like. See Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org.,
307 U.S. 496, 512 (1939); Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 28, § 16.54, at 1130. The right
of association, on the other hand, is more; it includes the right to "express one's attitudes
or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with it." Griswold v. Connect-
icut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965) (emphasis added). Although the Court generally speaks of
the right of association as deriving from the right to free speech, some commentators
believe the right of assembly provides a more "logical basis" for the right of association.
C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. Rev.
964, 1030-32 (1978). Professor C. Edwin Baker contends that "an association is merely
an assembly dispersed over time and space." Id. at 1032.
31. The right to petition the government for redress of grievances is the right to ap-
peal to the government and to the courts. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar
Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-22 (1967). Some of the courts that have dealt with public em-
ployee freedom of association claims have equated union "grievances" with such consti-
tutionally protected grievances. See Stellmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891, 892-93
(D. Conn. 1989); Gavrilles v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984). Argua-
bly, however, this view is erroneous. See infra text accompanying notes 100-03.
32. The right to associate for the purpose of religious worship exists in a well-worn
track. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972); 3 Ronald D. Rotunda et al.,
Treatise on Constitutional Law: Substance and Procedure § 21.6 (1986).
33. See U.S. Const. amend. I; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618
(1984).
34. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622; Emerson, supra note 26, at 2.
35. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13 (1988);
Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; see also Leading Cases, supra note 28, at 204 ("[Tlhe Court thus
underscored the instrumental role of freedom of association not just in defining the source
of the right, but also in framing the analysis suitable for protecting that right.").
36. See Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
37. Id. at 622; see also New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13 ("[T]he ability and
the opportunity to combine with others to advance one's views is a powerful practical
means of ensuring the perpetuation of the freedoms the First Amendment has guaranteed
to individuals as against the government.").
38. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 294 (1981).
39. See, e.g., Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (the jaycees); New
York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1 (1988) (various private clubs);
NAACP v. Alabama ex. rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (the NAACP).
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guarded through freedom of association.' As one commentator has
remarked, the right of expressive association has "traditionally been little
more than a shorthand for safeguarding an individual's [right to free
speech] when he exercises [it] through a group."41 While at times the
Court has opined that freedom of expressive association extends to
groups organized for social, economic, or cultural purposes,42 the cases
nevertheless suggest that some sort of political or ideological tie is neces-
sary to legitimize an associational claim.43
Thus, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson," the first modem deci-
sion to recognize a freedom of association,4" the Court reversed a con-
tempt order against the NAACP for refusal to disclose a membership list
because the right of association embraced that group's banding together
"for the advancement of beliefs and ideas."41 With similar rhetoric, the
Court invalidated a statute limiting voter-participation in more than one
party primary47 and a second statute limiting political contributions.48
In another line of cases, the Court annulled legislation restricting the
rights of organizations to provide their members with legal representa-
tion, deeming lawyering and litigation in these instances to be essential
for petition and speech.49 By contrast, the Court summarily upheld
legislation regulating health maintenance organizations-associations
whose endeavors, while important, were deemed unrelated to any First
Amendment activity.50
In perhaps the most striking set of decisions, the Supreme Court up-
held laws compelling certain private groups to admit unwanted mem-
40. See Torke, supra note 26, at 50-51.
41. Raggi, supra note 26, at 11.
42. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989); Roberts, 468 U.S. at 622;
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958).
43. See Torke, supra note 26, at 55.
44. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
45. See Emerson, supra note 26, at 1; Raggi, supra note 26, at 2.
46. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460.
47. See Krusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 61 (1973).
48. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 22 (1976).
49. See United Transp. Union v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 576, 580-83 (1971); United Mine
Workers of America v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 221-25 (1967); Brother-
hood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex reL Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 5-8 (1964);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); Tribe, supra note 26, § 12-26, at 1011-12
(discussing legal services cases).
50. See Garcia v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 421 U.S. 995, 995 (1975); see
also Tribe, supra note 26, § 12-26, at 1011-12 (describing contrast between lawyering and
health care cases); Raggi, supra note 26, at 9 n.41:
The Mine Workers were facilitating the means by which their members could
petition the courts, a right expressly safeguarded by the first amendment, but
while the Court has recognized the importance of medical care as a necessity of
life, it has yet to recognize it as a constitutionally protected right. And without
some underlying constitutional right specifically without some underlying first
amendment right, a group has not been able to gain Court recognition of its free-
dom of association."
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
1992]
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bers.51 Each group defended itself by asserting a right of association that
encompassed the privilege to exclude whomever it pleased; and each such
defense was rejected by the Court because the group failed to prove that
its exclusionary policies were necessary for the accomplishment of activi-
ties protected by the First Amendment. In Runyan v. McCrary,52 for
example, Justice Stewart stated that the right to freedom of association
would protect segregation-minded parents if they wanted to send their
children to a school advocating segregation, but not if they wanted to
send their children to a school implementing that doctrine. 53 There was
no showing that "discontinuance of [the] discriminatory admission prac-
tices would inhibit in any way the teaching in these schools of any ideas
or dogma."54 Conversely, the Court made clear that associations formed
for the advocacy of political ideas could not similarly be compelled to
admit members with different political views, since such would alter the
group's protected expression.55
51. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1988);
Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987);
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 626-27 (1984); Runyan v. McCrary, 427
U.S. 160, 175-76 (1976).
52. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
53. See id. at 176.
54. Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted); see also New York State Club Ass'n,
487 U.S. at 13:
[The law] does not affect... the ability of individuals to form associations that
will advocate public or private viewpoints. It does not require the clubs 'to
abandon or alter' any activities that are protected by the First Amendment. If a
club seeks to exclude individuals who do not share the views that the club's
members wish to promote, the Law erects no obstacle to this end.
(citations omitted); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 548 ("mT1he evidence
fails to demonstrate that admitting women to Rotary Clubs will affect in any significant
way the existing members' ability to carry out their various purposes."); Roberts, 468
U.S. at 626 (holding that right of expressive association does not protect Jaycees from
mandate of Minnesota Human Rights Act ordering the admission of women, because
Jaycees made no showing that ability to engage in protected expressive activities thereby
would be impaired).
55. See New York State Club Ass'n, 487 U.S. at 13.
The Court has recognized two wholesale exceptions to this principle of non-interfer-
ence with the right to political association-patronage dismissals and the Hatch Act.
Under the first exception, dismissals and other unfavorable personnel decisions taken on
the basis of party affiliation, while implicating the right of association and speech, are
held to be justified under certain circumstances as serving the compelling interest of en-
suring effective and efficient government employees. See Rutan v. Republican Party, 110
S. Ct. 2729, 2735-37 (1990); Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 517-20 (1980); Elrod v.
Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360-63 (1976).
The Hatch Act forbids federal employees from taking an "active part in political man-
agement or in political campaigns." 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1988). The Supreme Court
holds the Hatch Act to be justified as serving the compelling interest of ensuring that the
government "operate[s] effectively and fairly, [that] elections... play their proper part in
representative government, and [that] employees themselves are.., sufficiently free from
improper influences." United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548, 564 (1973); see also Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 618 (1973)
(upholding analogous state statute); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S.
75, 103 (1947) (upholding Hatch Act).
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Two modem cases are particularly instructive as to the scope of the
right of expressive association: NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co. ,56 and
City of Dallas v. StanglinY In Claiborne Hardware, the Court held that
an NAACP-organized boycott of white Mississippi businesses, although
superficially an "economic" undertaking, actually constituted a group
"political" endeavor entitled to First Amendment protection. 8 Accord-
ingly, the Court held the boycott beyond the reach of rational state regu-
lation. 9 In Stanglin, by contrast, the Court held that since teenagers
socializing in a roller skating rink were not engaged in political conduct,
they enjoyed no regulatory immunity (in this case, from an ordinance
restricting the rink to teenagers of certain ages).' The Stanglin Court,
moreover, expressly refuted the theretofore tentative idea of a "genera-
lized right of 'social association,' "6 conceding only that group activity
need not "pertain directly to politics" to be protected by the First
Amendment.62
B. Freedom of Intimate Association-A Substantive Due Process
Doctrine
The right of intimate association63 is the right to form and preserve
"highly personal relationships [free] from unjustified interference by the
State."" The Constitution protects intimate association as a fundamen-
tal aspect of the right to liberty guaranteed by the due process clauses,
and as an implicit part of the Bill of Rights.6" Intimate association is
closely related to the fundamental right to privacy. 66 Justice Brennan set
forth the rationale for such a right in his opinion for the Court in
Roberts:
[C]ertain kinds of personal bonds have played a critical role in the
56. 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
57. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
58. See Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 914-15.
59. See id.
60. Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 24-25.
61. Id. at 25.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618-19 (1984).
64. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618; accord Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 544 (1987).
The Court first used the terms "intimate association" in Roberts in 1984. See Roberts,
468 U.S. at 618. Yet in so doing, it embraced a phrase coined four years earlier by
Professor Kenneth Karst. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association,
89 Yale LJ. 624, 624-25 (1980). Karst was summing up what he perceived as the "single
theme" in a line of Supreme Court decisions pertaining to constitutional protection of
certain close relationships. Id. The Court has displayed a dedication to Karst's
formulation.
65. See Board of Directors of Rotary Club Intl, 481 U.S. at 545; Roberts, 468 U.S. at
618-19; Nowak & Rotunda, supra note 28, § 16.41, at 1063; Karst, supra note 64, at 624-
25.
66. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965); Nowak & Rotunda, supra
note 28, § 16.41, at 1063; Karst, supra note 64, at 624-25.
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culture and traditions of the Nation by cultivating and transmitting
shared ideals and beliefs; they thereby foster diversity and act as criti-
cal buffers between the individual and the power of the State. More-
over, the constitutional shelter afforded such relationships reflects the
realization that individuals draw much of their emotional enrichment
from close ties with others. Protecting these relationships from unwar-
ranted state interference therefore safeguards the ability independently
to define one's identity that is central to any concept of liberty.67
Thus far, the Supreme Court has adhered to an extremely narrow con-
struction of the right of intimate association, perceiving it to inhere only
in relationships that involve the "creation and sustenance of a fam-
ily '6 s -marriage, 69 childbirth,7" child rearing and education, 1 and co-
habitation with relatives. 2 The Court has declined to extend this right
to unrelated persons living together,'7 and to homosexuals privately en-
gaging in consensual sodomy. 4 Justice Scalia, for his part, appears to
resist the notion that a right of intimate association even exists.75 In
Bowers v. Hardwick,71 moreover, the Court seemed to call this entire doc-
trine into question by suggesting that the generally cited cases hinged on
the existence of family planning issues, not of personal relationships.
7 7
Still, the Court has expressly declined to rule out the possibility that
protected intimate association may exist beyond the family.78 The Court
has adopted arguably flexible factors for judging whether an association
is sufficiently intimate to warrant protection: size, purpose, selectivity,
and whether members are secluded from others in critical aspects of the
relationship.7 9 Indeed, at least one commentator views these factors as
"pregnant with potential" for embracing a wide range of small groups.8 0
II. A DOCTRINAL APPROACH
The Supreme Court doctrines compel certain straightforward answers
to the question of whether Connick's public-concern rule should apply to
the freedom-of-association claims of public employees. Simply put, the
67. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618-19 (citations omitted).
68. Id. at 619.
69. See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-87 (1978).
70. See Carey v. Population Sers. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 693-94 (1977).
71. See Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 850 (1977).
72. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977) (plurality
opinion).
73. See Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1974).
74. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).
75. See New York State Club Ass'n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1988)
(Scalia, J., concurring); Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537, 550 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring).
76. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
77. See id. at 190-91.
78. See Board of Directors of Rotary Int'l, 481 U.S. at 545.
79. See id. at 546; Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 620 (1984).
80. Torke, supra note 26, at 50.
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rule should apply to those claims based on the right of expressive associa-
tion, but not those based on the right of intimate association."1 Surpris-
ingly, the lower courts that have considered the question thus far have,
through either misunderstanding or disregard of the pertinent doctrines,
failed to articulate these answers.82
A. Proposed Rule for Claims Based on the First Amendment Right of
Expressive Association
With respect to claims based on the First Amendment right of associa-
tion (the right of expressive association 3) the Court's decisions clearly
mandate application of Connick's public-concern rule. These decisions
further mandate that the public-concern inquiry focus on the expression
sought to be advanced by the plaintiff through the associational member-
ship. These conclusions follow whether one reasons from a doctrinal or a
precedential standpoint.
From a doctrinal standpoint, Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that
the right of expressive association must be anchored in some activity in-
dependently protected by the First Amendment." It follows that no
right can arise in connection with activity specifically denied the in-
dependent protection of the First Amendment, such as the expression of
public employees on issues of personal nature.85
From a precedential standpoint, virtually every Supreme Court case to
recognize a right of expressive association-and certainly every modem
case to do so-involved a group that was engaged in political or ideologi-
cal advocacy. 6 Accordingly, a threshold requirement tantamount to the
81. See infra notes 83-91 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 118-23 and accompanying text.
83. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
85. The personal-issue speech of public employees under Connick is a classic example
of such an activity. Cf. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1989) (holding
that teenagers in roller skating rink enjoy no right of expressive association because there
is no indication they engage in "expressive activity . . . protected by the First
Amendment").
86. See Torke, supra note 26, at 55; see also supra notes 44-61 and accompanying text
(discussing expressive association cases).
The prominent exceptions are Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940), in which the
Court struck down a statute banning peaceful labor picketing, and the line of cases in-
volving the rights of unions to employ legal staffs for the handling of worker injury
claims. See supra notes 49-50. As for Thornhill, Professor Tribe observes that the Court
has virtually neglected that decision: "[Tlhe states are essentially as free to regulate labor
picketing today as if Thornhill had not been decided." Tribe, supra note 26, § 12-7, at 598
n.3 (emphasis added). As for the legal staff cases, in a concurring opinion in Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, Justice O'Connor suggested what is likely the modern Supreme
Court's attitude toward these decisions: she ignored them. See Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634-35 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring). Instead, Justice
O'Connor drew a sharp distinction between group speech "on public affairs," which qual-
ifies for First Amendment protection, and group speech "intended and used to promote a
commercial transaction[,]" which includes union speech and which may be regulated by
rationally related legislation. Id. at 634. O'Connor categorically concluded that "lawyer-
19921
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public-concern rule set forth in Connick arguably already attends the
right of expressive association. In fact, Justice O'Connor suggested as
much in her concurring opinion in Roberts v. United States Jaycees.87
This concurrence sharply distinguished between group speech "on public
affairs" and group speech "intended and used to promote a commercial
transaction."88 The former, Justice O'Connor wrote, enjoyed First
Amendment protection, while the latter was subject to rational state reg-
ulation.89 The Court as a whole seemed openly to support such a binary
view in City of Dallas v. Stanglin.9 There the Court suggested that asso-
ciational speech pertaining only, either directly or indirectly, to politics
enjoyed special First Amendment protection.9" Thus, any "extension" of
Connick's public-concern rule to the sphere of expressive association
would be superfluous, as the rule is already firmly ensconced there.
It is fair to observe, however, that this precedential argument is prone
to the criticism that it is purely inductive, and thus results in an unjusti-
fied conclusion. Indeed, the fact that previous cases happened to involve
group speech of public concern is not reason to establish public concern
as a formal threshold for protection.92 Still, the doctrinal rationale set
forth above93 provides ample reason for holding the public-concern rule
applicable to association claims.
The lower courts considering the applicability of Connick's public-con-
cern rule to public employees' First Amendment association claims have,
by and large, misunderstood or disregarded the pertinent doctrines and
precedents. The common theme is a lack of attentiveness to the Court's
instrumental theory-that expressive association exists merely as an in-
strument for securing the primary First Amendment right to free speech.
ing to advance social goals may be speech, but ordinary commercial law practice is not."
Id. at 636 (citations omitted); see also infra text accompanying notes 87-91 (discussing the
Court's apparent adoption of O'Connor's view of expressive association).
87. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 631-40 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
88. Id. at 634 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89. See id. at 634-35 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
90. 490 U.S. 19 (1989).
91. See Stanglin, 490 U.S. at 23-25; see also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458
U.S. 886, 914-15 (1982) (holding NAACP-organized economic boycott of white Missis-
sippi businesses to be political expression protected by the First Amendment).
92. Arguably then, the first, doctrinal rationale discussed above emerges as the pre-
ferred basis for such a holding.
Connick itself relied on the same inductive rationale, but with respect to speech alone.
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-47 (1983). Commentators have criticized Con-
nick on this basis. See, eg., Estlund, supra note 9, at 3:
A long tradition of special solicitude for speech on public issues played a crucial
role in the growth of First Amendment doctrine, but it did not take the form of
an explicit threshold test or category .... [Tihe public concern test introduced
in Connick marks a fundamental departure from this scheme;
D. Gordon Smith, Comment, Beyond "Public Concern". New Free Speech Standards for
Public Employees, 57 U. Chi. L. Rev. 249, 256 (1990) [hereinafter Beyond Public Con-
cern] ("[Tihat these previous cases had involved speech of public concern was not reason,
in itself, to limit constitutional protections to speech of public concern.").
93. See supra text accompanying notes 84-85.
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As a consequence, these courts have yet to articulate either the doctrinal
or precedential arguments outlined above.
Courts holding Connick inapplicable' have generally advanced two
arguments. First, they have seized on statements in various Supreme
Court opinions suggesting that the First Amendment right of association
is not limited to groups organized for political ends, but extends to those
formed for economic, cultural, or social ends as well.9 5 They have rea-
soned, on this basis, that the First Amendment right of association must
embrace associations regardless of whether their expressive activities are
of public concern. 96 Yet, even if the Supreme Court statements upon
94. See Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1556-57 (11th
Cir. 1987); Saye v. St. Vrain Valley Sch. Dist. Re-lJ, 785 F.2d 862, 866-67 & n.1 (10th
Cir. 1986); Stellmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1989); Gavrilles
v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 n.* (D. Mass. 1984); Parker v. Cronvich, 567 F.
Supp. 1073, 1076 nn.6-7 (E.D. La. 1983).
95. See Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1557-58 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609, 622 (1984); NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)); see
also supra text accompanying note 26 (discussing statements seized upon).
96. See, e.g., Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1558 ("[A]pplication of a requirement that associa-
tional activity relate to a matter of public conern ... would overturn Supreme Court...
jurisprudence .... ").
In a variation of this argument, some courts have maintained that Connick's public-
concern rule must not be applied to associational claims because the First Amendment
protects the right of public employees to form and join labor unions. See, e.g., Parker v.
Cronvich, 567 F. Supp. 1073, 1076 & n.7 (E.D. La. 1983) ("[P]laintiffs have also alleged
that Sheriff Cronvich... fired them because of (a) their support for Cronvich's political
opponent, and (1) their membership in the Union. If only the latter were true, defendants
would have violated the plaintiff's freedom of association."). A number of lower courts
hold that the First and Fourteenth amendments guarantee the right to unionize. See
Lontine v. VanCleave, 483 F.2d 966, 967 (10th Cir. 1973); AFSCME v. Woodward, 406
F.2d 137, 139 (8th Cir. 1969); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287, 288-89 (7th Cir.
1968); see also Note, Developments in the Law-Public Employment, 97 Harv. L Rev.
1611, 1678 (1984) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]. The Supreme Court has yet to
address the issue squarely. See Developments in the Law, supra, at 1678 n.l 1. A number
of cases have suggested that the Supreme Court recognizes such a constitutional right.
See Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464-65(1979) (per curiam); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 15-17 (1966). Yet the rhetoric of
the Supreme Court's modern decisions suggests the contrary. See, eg., Roberts, 468 U.S.
at 637-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring):
A State is free to impose rational regulation of the membership of a labor union
representing 'the general business needs of employees.' ... The Court has thus
ruled that a State may compel association for the commercial purposes of en-
gaging in collective bargaining, administering labor contracts, and adjusting
employment-related grievances ....
(citation omitted); see generally, James G. Pope, The Three-Systems Ladder of First
Amendment Valuer" Two Rungs and a Black Hole, I 1 Hastings Const. L.Q. 189 (1984)(arguing that labor activities occupy "black hole" on hierarchy of First Amendment val-
ues). Some courts manage to skirt the issue by holding union-related association to be
not only protected by the First Amendment, but also of public concern. See eg., Terry
v. Village of Glendale Heights, No. 86-C4468, 1989 WL 106623, at 06 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 13,
1989) ("[S]peech accompanying [the plaintiff's] successful effort to organize Village
maintenance workers.., is of public concern"). This view is tenuous, however, in light
of Connick, which held a public employee's efforts to rally coworkers for a grievance
committee to be expression of only personal interest. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S.
1992]
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which these lower courts relied were not dicta, as the cases suggest they
were,97 these courts have overlooked the fact that the right of expressive
association exists not independently, but rather as an instrument for
safeguarding the primary First Amendment liberties.98 In other words,
even if this freedom extended to groups regardless of whether their activ-
ities were of public concern, it plainly could not extend to groups whose
activities have been specifically denied First Amendment protection.99
The second argument advanced by those courts is that when a public
employee files a union "grievance," such action is, in a constitutional
sense, the petition of government for the redress of grievances." Those
courts assume that the First Amendment right to petition can anchor an
associational claim, given that group activity for First Amendment ends
is generally protected.101 When the Supreme Court speaks of the First
Amendment right to petition the government for the redress of griev-
ances, however, it is referring to the right to appeal to the legislature and
the judicial system 1°--not the right to challenge a decision of the gov-
ernment as an employer. The Connick Court, in fact, effectively ruled
out such an argument in refusing to countenance the respondent's "at-
tempt to constitutionalize the employee grievance."1 3
As a general matter, courts holding Connick inapplicable to associa-
tion claims"° not only have permitted plaintiffs to circumvent the Con-
nick rule, but also have undermined the Court's expressive association
doctrine. Plaintiffs deprived of free speech claims by Connick, but whose
expressive activities happened to involve groups, have been permitted to
proceed under the rubric of freedom of association."05 This has led to the
anomaly of groups, and of individuals who are associated with groups,
being accorded greater freedom of expression than solitary individuals. 106
138, 150-54 (1983); see also supra note 11 (discussing public employees' statutory, as
opposed to constitutional, right to unionize).
97. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29, 95.
98. See supra text accompanying notes 33-37.
99. See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
100. See Stelmaker v. DePetrillo, 710 F. Supp. 891, 892-93 (D. Conn. 1989); Gavrilles
v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 (D. Mass. 1984).
101. See Stellmaker, 710 F. Supp. at 892-93; Gavrilles, 579 F. Supp. at 304.
102. See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 220-23 (1967).
103. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 154 (1983) (emphasis added). Professor Stephen
Allred, who surveyed lower court decisions applying Connick, observes that "[p]erhaps
the most frequent reasons cited by the courts for finding speech outside the ambit of
Connick is that the speech arose as part of a grievance." Stephen Allred, From Connick
to Confusion: The Struggle to Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 Ind. L.J.
43, 73 (1988); see, e.g., Cook v. Ashmore, 579 F. Supp. 78, 84 (N.D. Ga. 1984) (holding
union grievance involving notice of termination not of public concern).
104. See supra note 19.
105. See, e.g., Gavrilles v. O'Connor, 579 F. Supp. 301, 304 n.* (D. Mass. 1984) ("[I]t
is unlikely plaintiff has stated a claim for violation of her First Amendment freedom of
speech, since her [union] grievance was a matter only of personal interest .... Nonethe-
less... I have ruled that Count II states a claim for violation of plaintiff's First Amend-
ment freedom of association ...." (citations omitted)).
106. See id.
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These results turn on its head the doctrine that expressive association is a
function of the rights of solitary individuals.10 7
Courts correctly holding Connick's public-concern rule applicable"° '
have seemed little more attentive to Supreme Court doctrine. None has
expressly relied on the Court's instrumental theory of First Amendment
association." 9 Instead, they have offered a patchwork of legalistic ratio-
nales that seem to presuppose a right of association existing indepen-
dently of, and on an equal footing with, the right to free speech.
The first argument set forth by these courts is that Connick expressly
relied' on a series of McCarthy era decisions striking down loyalty
oaths imposed on public employees,"' decisions which "deal[t] with
speech and associational rights."'1 2 These courts reason that because
"Connick itself, although essentially a speech case, contain[ed] associa-
tional overtones,""' 3 the public-concern rule should apply to associa-
tional claims as well.'1  The second argument set forth by these courts is
that to hold otherwise would protect the right of association more than
the right to speech, whereas in the "closely related area of the first
amendment's petition clause, the Supreme Court emphatically has es-
chewed establishing, among first amendment expression rights, a hierar-
chy of labels.""' Again, the language used, in this case by the Seventh
Circuit, suggests a lack of attentiveness to the Supreme Court's instru-
mental theory in favor of the idea that speech, petition, and association
stand side-by-side in the constellation of First Amendment liberties.
107. See supra notes 33-61 and accompanying text.
108. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991); Monks v. Marlinga,
923 F.2d 423, 425 (6th Cir. 1991); Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 691-93 (6th Cir. 1985);
Broderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D. Mass. 1991); Petrozza v. Incorporated
Village of Freeport, 602 F. Supp. 137, 143 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
109. See cases cited supra note 108.
110. See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 144-45 (1983).
111. See generally Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (holding that
anti-communist loyalty oath may not be imposed as a condition of public employment);
Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961) (holding loyalty oath imposed
on teachers unconstitutional); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S 479 (1960) (holding that re-
quirement that teachers file affidavits on organizational memberships violates right of
associational freedom); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (holding that loyalty
oath imposed on public employees violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth
Amendment).
112. Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
113. Broderick v. Roache, 767 F. Supp. 20, 25 n.9 (D. Mass. 1991).
114. See id. at 24-25; see also Boals v. Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985) ("In
other words, Pickering and Connick, while themselves speech cases, are based upon free-
dom of association cases.").
In support of this notion that speech and association should be kept on equal footing,
some of these courts note the Connick Court's reference to "associations" in observing
that the loyalty-oath cases involved the issue of "whether government employees could be
prevented or 'chilled' by the fear of discharge from joining political parties or other as-
sociations that certain public officials might find 'subversive.'" Boals, 775 F.2d at 692
(citing Connick, 461 U.S. at 144-45).
115. Griffin, 929 F.2d at 1213-14 (citing McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479, 485
(1985)).
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Although the arguments of these courts suggest some feel for the rele-
vant precedents, they miss the larger, more fundamental, doctrinal basis
for rejecting the plaintiffs' claims. Doctrine mandates that the right of
expressive association must be anchored in some activity independently
protected by the First Amendment.1 16 It follows that no such right can
attend activity specifically denied the independent protection of the First
Amendment, such as the personal-issue expression of public employees
under Connick.117
B. Rule for Claims Based on the Substantive Due Process Right of
Intimate Association
Regardless of whether the Supreme Court continues to construe inti-
mate association narrowly, Connick's expression-based public-concern
rule should be held inapplicable to claims based on this distinct, substan-
tive-due-process based right. To conclude otherwise would be contrary
to the very function of this right-to safeguard certain associations of
highly personal interest.
In contrast to the disagreement over the public-concern rule's applica-
bility to First Amendment association claims, the rule's irrelevance to
due-process claims seems a foregone conclusion. Indeed, a long line of
lower court decisions addresses the extent to which public employers
may discipline employees for maintaining private relationships of which
the employers disapprove,' 18 and no case has made the mistake of invok-
ing Connick's public-concern rule. Courts are sharply divided, however,
as to how much protection public employees' private associations should
be accorded, with most cases involving employees disciplined for cohab-
116. See supra note 85.
117. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
118. Compare Fleisher v. City of Signal Hill, 829 F.2d 1491, 1496-1500 (9th Cir. 1987)
(declining to extend fundamental rights to privacy or intimate association to police officer
dismissed for admitting to sex with a minor when the officer was 18 years old), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988) and Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 806-08
(N.D. Ill. 1986) (declining to extend fundamental right of association to unmarried police
officers cohabiting) with Thorne v. City of El Segundo, 726 F.2d 459, 468-72 (9th Cir.
1983) (holding that refusal to hire because of sexual history impinged upon constitution-
ally protected privacy and association), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 979 (1984) and Briggs v.
North Muskegon Police Dep't, 563 F. Supp. 585, 592 (W.D. Mich. 1983) (extending
constitutional protection to unmarried police officers cohabiting), aff'd, 746 F.2d 1475
(6th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 909 (1985).
Early such cases spoke of the employee's interest as the right to privacy as recognized
by the Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and its progeny.
See Hollenbaugh v. Carnegie Free Library, 436 F. Supp. 1328, 1333-34 (W.D. Pa. 1977),
aff'd, 578 F.2d 1374 (3d Cir.), cert denied, 439 U.S. 1052 (1978). Later decisions have
observed that the right to privacy is coextensive with the right of intimate association
subsequently enunciated by the Supreme Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468
U.S. 609 (1984), and have used the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Fleisher, 829 F.2d at
1500 ("[Tlhe freedom of intimate association is coextensive with the right of privacy;
both ... describe that body of rights that protect intimate human relationships from
unwarranted intrusion or interference by the state.").
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iting with persons other than their spouses.1 9 While some courts have
held such extramarital relationships protected, others have refused to so
hold.12 The former decisions seem tenuous in light of Bowers v. Hard-
wick. 1 2' There, the Supreme Court declined to extend constitutional pro-
tection to homosexuals privately engaging in consensual sodomy, opining
that some connection to "family, marriage, or procreation," and not
merely to "private sexual conduct," was required to entitle an activity to
protection."2 Moreover, although all of these due-process decisions
have refrained from applying Connick's public-concern rule, many have
invoked the Pickering-Connick axiom that the government's interest
should be given greater deference when its actions intrude on the rights
of its own employees than when they intrude on the rights of citizens in
general."2 In sum, although the public-concern rule is not applied to
claims based on the right of intimate association, this right will likely
provide public employees with scant protection for their associations.
III. THEORETiCAL DEBATE OVER THE FUNCTION OF THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
Lurking in the background of this debate over Connick's applicability
to public employee claims based on the First Amendment freedom of
association (as opposed to the due-process right of intimate association)
is a more general theoretical debate over the function of the First
Amendment. In particular, this question creates a confrontation be-
tween the idea that the First Amendment should protect only public-
issue speech,12 a principle showcased in Connick, and the idea that,
although protection of public-issue speech should be of central impor-
tance, the First Amendment should protect virtually all expression rele-
vant to individual self-fulfillment and self-realization. 125 These
competing theoretical considerations provide a basis for analyzing, and
perhaps explaining, the seemingly anomalous lower court cases dealing
with the applicability of Connick's public-concern rule to association
claims.
A. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Political Theory of the First
Amendment
The notion that the First Amendment should protect only expression
relevant to self-governance-in other words, expression of public con-
119. See supra note 118.
120. See supra note 118.
121. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
122. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191.
123. See e.g., Kukla v. Village of Antioch, 647 F. Supp. 799, 805 (N.D. 111. 1986)
("Thus when the benefit at stake is a government job, and the individual's exercise of a
right interferes with the provision of government services, the government interest carries
more weight in the balance against the exercise of the right.").
124. See infra notes 126-31 and accompanying text.
125. See infra notes 132-35 and accompanying text.
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cern-is closely associated with the theories of Professor Alexander
Meildejohn. 2 6 Meiklejohn originally argued that the First Amendment
should protect only speech that related directly to self-government.
27
Later, however, Meildejohn embraced a more expansive view of speech
relating to self-government, deeming it to include "novels and dramas
and paintings and poems."'' 28 Proponents of judicial restraint, such as
Professor Lillian R. BeVier and Judge Robert Bork, have breathed new
life into Meiklejohn's original ideas. 129 Professor BeVier, for example,
maintains that the "central relationship between political speech and the
constitutionally established processes of representative democracy" man-
dates a strict, political-speech interpretation of the First Amendment. 3
Meiklejohn's various conceptions of the ambit of First Amendment cov-
erage seem much on the mind of the Court today. 3'
B. The Liberty Theory of the First Amendment
Other theorists, notably Professors Steven H. Shiffrin, Martin H. Red-
ish, and C. Edwin Baker, champion the rival "liberty" theory of the First
Amendment. This theory holds that the First Amendment should em-
brace not only political expression, but virtually all expression relevant to
individual self-fulfillment and self-realization. 32 Professor Baker locates
126. See Alexander Meiklejohn, Free Speech and its Relation to Self-Government 94
(1948) [hereinafter Meiklejohn, Free Speech].
127. See id. at 22-27.
128. Alexander Meildejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev.
245, 263.
129. See Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into
the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 Stan. L. Rev. 299, 300-01 (1978); Robert H.
Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 Ind. L.J. 1, 20 (1971).
Judge Bork later disavowed this opinion, calling it "speculative, tentative," and
"dumb." Nomination of Robert H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearings before the Comm. on the Judiciary United States Senate,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. 264 (1987) (statement of Robert H. Bork, U.S. Circuit Judge for
the District of Columbia).
130. BeVier, supra note 129, at 302.
131. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 395 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
("[W]e have variously described [matters of public concern] as those matters dealing in
some way with 'the essence of self-government,' matters as to which 'free and open debate
is vital to an informed ... electorate,' and matters as to which 'debate ... [must] be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.'" (quoting respectively Garrison v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 64, 74-75 (1964); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 571-72 (1968); Dun &
Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755 (1985) (plurality opinion)
(quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964))) with City of Dallas
v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 25 (1989) ("[Tlhe right of expressive association extends to
groups organized to engage in speech that does, not pertain directly to politics.") (empha-
sis added).
132. See Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment, Democracy, and Romance 5
(1990); C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L.
Rev. 964, 964-66, 990-92 (1978); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 591 (1982).
Commentators who favor greater associational freedom espouse similar views. They
stress the critical importance of individual involvement in associations not only in fur-
thering self-governance, but also in promoting individual self-fulfillment and self-realiza-
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the rationale for this view in the social contract: in order for the state to
justify the imposition of legal obligations on the individual, the state
must respect individuals' "dignity and equal worth," and this entails
honoring their rights to self-definition.13 Professor Shifflin, for his part,
states the following:
[A] major purpose of the first amendment... is to protect the roman-
tics-those who would break out of classical forms: the dissenters, the
unorthodox, the outcasts. The first amendment's purpose and function
in the American polity is... to sponsor the individualism, the rebel-
liousness, the antiauthoritarianism, the spirit of nonconformity within
us all.134
The Supreme Court has yet to adopt a single, all-embracing theory of
the First Amendment such as those outlined above. Rather, the Court
has deployed the rhetoric of the different theories as the circumstances
have warranted. 13
5
C. Meiklejohn, Connick and Criticism
As between these two theories, Connick signified the "Meiklejohniza-
tion" of the First Amendment rights of public employees. 36 Given the
oft-declared centrality of speech of public concern to the First Amend-
ment, 1 37 it was altogether convenient for the Court to seize upon this
concept, transform it into a threshold rule, and use it as a tool for limit-
ing a perceived flood of public-employee free-speech claims. 138 Yet com-
mentators almost uniformly have been hostile toward Connick,
perceiving a number of theoretical and practical pitfalls associated with
its approach.
Commentators maintain, to start, that Connick's reasoning was purely
inductive, and thus resulted in an unjustified conclusion. "[T]he fact that
these previous cases had involved speech of public concern," one com-
mentator has asserted, "was not reason, in itself, to limit constitutional
protections to speech of public concern."139 Professor Cynthia L.
tion. See Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1001, 1002-04 (1983); Soifer, supra note 26, at 645-46; Torke, supra note 26, at
54-59.
133. Baker, supra note 132, at 991.
134. Shiffrin, supra note 132, at 5.
135. Compare New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964) ("The publi-
cation here... communicated information, expressed opinion, recited grievances, and
protested claimed abuses, and sought financial support on behalf of a movement whose
existence and objectives are matters of the highest public interest and concern.") with Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) ("It is the right of the public to
receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral, and other ideas and experiences
which is crucial here.").
136. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 2 & n.l1.
137. See e.g., Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 266.
138. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 12.
139. Smith, supra note 92, at 256; see also Estlund, supra note 9, at 2 ("Connick ...
introduced, for the first time in the history of modem First Amendment jurisprudence,
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Estlund, perhaps Connick's most strident critic, argues further that the
danger of Connick is that the public-concern rule will "generate, by the
inexorable operation of stare decisis, a judicially approved catalogue of
legitimate subjects of public discussion."'" Professor Estlund maintains
not only that judges are ill-qualified to identify legitimate subjects of pub-
lic discussion,' but also that for them to do so conflicts with the basic
tenet of democratic self-governance that the people-not the govern-
ment-should control the public agenda.142 The rule, Professor Estlund
contends, will thus tend to "undermine the protection of the very speech
it singles out for solicitude."' 43
Moreover, commentators have observed that application of the rule
has proven wildly unpredictable, with some commentators actually cata-
loging the similar cases that have resulted in divergent outcomes.144 This
suggests that much speech mistakenly has been and will be denied pro-
tection.1 45 Professor Robert Post suggests that a significant cause of this
an explicitly content-based category of privileged 'public issue' speech that alone is enti-
tled to certain important protections.").
140. Estlund, supra note 9, at 3.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 30; see also Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 634 (1984)
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("[It is] the most basic guarantee of the First Amendment-
that citizens, not the government, control the content of public discussion.").
Professor Robert Post advances the same argument, concluding that the public-con-
cern rule thereby creates a "doctrinal impasse." Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Con-
cept of Discourse: Outrageous Opinion, Democratic Deliberation, and Hustler Magazine v.
Falwell, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 601, 670 (1990). "Speech can be deemed irrelevant for na-
tional self-definition only in the name of a particular, substantive vision of national iden-
tity. If this is done with the authority of the law, possible options for democratic
development will be foreclosed." Id. at 671.
143. Estlund, supra note 9, at 28.
144. See infra note 145.
145. As one indicia of this unpredictability, the Supreme Court itself twice split five to
four as to whether particular speech met the test. Compare Rankin v. McPherson, 483
U.S. 378, 386 (1987) (concluding that respondent's statement was of public concern) and
id. at 392 (Powell, J., concurring) (agreeing) with id. at 397-98 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(concluding that respondent's statement was not of public concern); compare also Con-
nick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149 (1983) (concluding that only one of several statements
made by respondent was of public concern) with id. at 162-63 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(concluding that all of the statements made by respondent were of public concern). Pro-
fessor Stephen Allred surveyed lower court cases decided pursuant to these two Supreme
Court decisions, only to conclude that they too were characterized by "conflict and con-
fusion." Allred, supra note 103, at 44. "[The courts have not defined with certainty
what speech is protected; indeed, little more emerges ... than an identification of the
variables, often contradictory, which influence the determination of whether speech is pro-
tected." Id. at 81 (emphasis added); see also Toni M. Massaro, Significant Silences: Free-
dom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 3, 25-37 (1987)
(describing Supreme Court's First Amendment jurisprudence concerning public employ-
ees as "vague,, and "internally inconsistent"); R. George Wright, Speech on Matters of
Public Interest and Concern, 37 De Paul L. Rev. 27, 28-29 (1987) (observing that public-
concern rule "has resulted in substantial numbers of inconsistent, irreconcilable deci-
sions"); Peter C. McCabe, III, Note, Connick v. Myers" New Restrictions on the Free
Speech Rights of Government Employees, 60 Ind. L.J. 339, 358-59 & n. 143 (1984-85) (sur-
veying inconsistent decisions); Smith, supra note 92, at 258, 359 at n.143 ("The most
[Vol. 61
PUBLIC WORKERS' RIGHT TO ASSOCIATE
unpredictability is the question of whether the rule is intended to be in-
terpreted as normative or descriptive."4 That is, should the rule test for
whether particular speech ought to be of public concern (the normative
view), or whether it already is of public concern (the descriptive view)? 47
To date, the Court has not provided precise guidance on this question.'4
D. Meiklejohn, Connick, and the Lower Courts
Because the public-concern rule has its roots in a general First Amend-
ment theory,149 Connick's critics worry that there is nothing to impede
the rule from "overtaking all of First Amendment doctrine."'5 "0 Applica-
tion of the rule to the First Amendment association claims of public em-
ployees' 51 would indeed seem a step in this direction. The Court's
instrumental theory, however, mandates this step.152 Application of the
rule should be viewed as a necessary corollary of Connick, not as an in-
stance of Connick's overtaking another area of the First Amendment.
Nevertheless, this perception of the public-concern rule as a problematic
new doctrine threatening to overrun the First Amendment suggests an
explanation for the behavior of the lower courts.
In particular, courts holding Connick inapplicable to the First Amend-
ment association claims of public employees arguably are motivated by
an unspoken hostility toward not only the public-concern rule but also
the Meiklejohn concept of the First Amendment in general. Speaking in
terms of an independent right of association protecting groups engaged in
even non-political activities, these courts adroitly, perhaps disingenu-
ously, circumvent Connick's imposition of the Meiklejohn concept and
fundamental problem with the public concern threshold test has emerged from attempts
to apply it: no one knows what 'public concern' is.").
146. See Post, supra note 142, at 669.
147. See id.
148. See id. at 668-69.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 136-138.
150. Estlund, supra note 9, at 27. Indeed, Professor Estlund maintains that the rule
represents an "Emerging First Amendment Category" of potentially broad application.
See id. at 1, 23. The Supreme Court has already explicitly applied the rule outside of the
public-employment context once, in the field of defamation. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc.
v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 755-61 (1985) (holding that allegedly libelous
speech that is not on a matter of public concern thus enjoys no special constitutionalimmunity); cf. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohen, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (holding that ac-
tion for invasion of privacy cannot be asserted when publicized subject matter is of public
record). Estlund maintains that the Court has used criteria resembling the rule in a wide
array of contexts, including a communicative tort case, see Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988), a statutory invasion of privacy action, see Florida Star v.
B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 530-36 (1989), and a flag-burning case, see Texas v. Johnson, 491
U.S. 397, 402-06, 410-22 (1989). See Estlund, supra note 9, at 23-28. Estlund bluntly
suggests that the Court deployed the rule because it is a "versatile doctrinal tool ....
well-suited to the task of taking or keeping the Constitution out of vast areas of the law, a
task that seems to be much on the mind of a majority of the Court today." Id. at 27.
151. See, eg., supra notes 83-91 and accompanying text (advocating application of
Connick's public-concern rule to public employees' First Amendment association claims).
152. See supra text accompanying notes 83-91.
1992]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
follow a preferred liberty approach.1 5 3 In Hatcher v. Board of Public Ed-
ucation & Orphanage,15 for example, the Eleventh Circuit conceded that
Connick foreclosed the plaintiff's claim as to free speech, but held that
the plaintiff nonetheless alleged a First Amendment infringement be-
cause "Connick is inapplicable to freedom of association claims." 55 This
must be the case, the Hatcher court reasoned, because the Supreme
Court has declared that the First Amendment right of association pro-
tected groups organized not only for political purposes, but also for cul-
tural, social, and economic ends.1 56 By neglecting the Supreme Court's
instrumental conception of First Amendment association, and by invok-
ing language associated with a preferred liberty concept of the First
Amendment, the Hatcher court thus successfully portrayed application
of Connick to associational claims as an unjustified extension of that
decision.
But what is truly striking about Hatcher is the fact that the court could
have ruled for the plaintiff even if it held Connick applicable to her claim.
Indeed, the plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that she was denied a job assign-
ment in retaliation for associating with parents and others in protest of a
board of education plan to close several schools.1 5 7 The court could have
concluded, appropriately, that this expressive activity involved a matter
of concern to the public.15 8 That even with these facts the court never-
theless went to great lengths to hold the public-concern rule inapplicable
to the plaintiff's claim suggests a deep aversion indeed for the approach
represented by Connick.
Courts correctly holding Connick applicable to First Amendment as-
sociation claims display an underlying acceptance--even if a grudging
one-of Connick's Meiklejohnization of the First Amendment rights of
public employees.1 9 Although these courts routinely muddle the issue
153. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Board of Pub. Educ. & Orphanage, 809 F.2d 1546, 1557-58
(11th Cir. 1987) ("We do not view Connick as a retreat from NAACP v. Alabama, in
which Justice Harlan wrote for the Court: 'it is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to
be advanced by association pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters
.. ' ") (citation omitted).
154. 809 F.2d 1546 (1lth Cir. 1987)
155. Id. at 1556 & n.19, 1558.
156. See id. at 1557-58 (citing Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 622
(1984); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)); see also supra text accompa-
nying notes 95-98 (discussing similar rhetoric).
157. See Hatcher, 809 F.2d at 1557.
158. Cf Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (holding that dismissal of
teacher in retaliation for writing letter to local newspaper critical of local school board
tax policies violated teacher's First Amendment rights); Piver v. Pender County Bd. of
Educ., 835 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding that school teacher's criticism of school
board proposal to dismiss principal held to be speech of public concern); Anderson v.
Central Point Sch. Dist. No. 6, 746 F.2d 505 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that teacher/coach
could not be fired for writing letters to school board members objecting to proposed
restructure of school athletic program because such speech met public-concern test); All-
red, supra note 103, at 50-55 (discussing decisions holding speech on matters of commu-
nity debate to be of public concern).
159. See Estlund, supra note 9, at 2 & n.1l.
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of the Supreme Court's instrumental theory of First Amendment associa-
tion,1 6° they nevertheless correctly display a sense that the right to free-
dom of association may not outstrip the right to freedom of speech.16 1
Still, some of these courts have been quick to note, by way of dicta, that
under circumstances not involving public employment, the First Amend-
ment protects broad areas of non-political expression, suggesting a pref-
erence on their part for a more general liberty-oriented conception of the
First Amendment. 162
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has delineated two categories of constitutionally
protected association: expressive association, and intimate association.
These two doctrines compel straightforward answers to the question of
Connick's applicability to public employees' freedom of association
claims: Connick's public-concern rule should be applied to claims based
on the right of expressive association because this right exists as an in-
strument or means of enhancing freedom of speech. Connick's public-
concern rule should not be applied to those claims based on the right of
intimate association, because this constitutionally recognized right, by
definition, protects associations of highly personal interest. While agree-
ing that the public-concern rule should not apply to intimate association
claims, courts are in conflict as to whether this rule should apply to ex-
pressive association claims. By and large, courts on each side of the con-
flict have overlooked the solution offered by the Supreme Court's
instrumental theory of expressive association. Even the courts holding
Connick applicable to these claims have preferred a patchwork of legalis-
tic arguments to this uncomplicated, doctrinally based solution. The dis-
agreement among the courts perhaps may be understood best as a
theoretical struggle over the function of the First Amendment, with
those holding the rule inapplicable displaying hostility toward the polit-
ical-speech theory of the First Amendment exemplified by Connick, and
those applying the rule, displaying support for or acquiescence to this
theory. Notwithstanding objections to Connick, Supreme Court doctrine
mandates application of the public-concern rule to the First Amendment
association claims of public employees. While the opposite holds true for
claims based on the right of intimate association, the Supreme Court's
narrow construction of this right sharply limits its utility for asserting
associational claims.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
161. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17. This is reflected in their conclusions
that if a public employee's individual speech must be tested for public concern, so must a
public employee's associational expression.
162. See Griffin v. Thomas, 929 F.2d 1210, 1213 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Boals v.
Gray, 775 F.2d 686, 692 (6th Cir. 1985) (stressing fact that speech not on matters of
public concern is not "'totally beyond the protection of the First Amendment' ") (cita-
tion omitted).
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